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THE DEATH OF VIOLENCE
Stephen Zanias
Introduction
Following the lead of the United States,
the world has taken a stand against terrorism,1
which plays a role on many different stages
around the world. Each stage has its unique set
of characters and history; and while the groups
may differ in geographic location, ideals, or
objectives, they are joined by the fact that they
have terrorized others to achieve their goals.
To many there is no justification for the atroc-
ities they have committed; to others the vio-
lence and the reasons for which a terrorist
group fights may be acceptable. As the saying
goes, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s
freedom fighter.”
One such group is ETA, an acronym in
Euskara (the language of the Basques) for
“Basque Fatherland and Liberty.” (“Terrorist
Group...”) While many feel ETA is an unjustifi-
able terrorist group, there are those who would
argue that this relatively small group of Basque
separatists are legitimately fighting for their
rights of freedom and self-determination. Like
many terrorist groups, the issue comes down
to a matter of perspective, one that involves in-
depth analysis of the history and motivations of
the parties involved.
However, setting aside the issue of legiti-
macy, a more pressing question for ETA con-
cerns not its present status, but more impor-
tantly its future. In conjunction with issues that
will be detailed in this article, the internation-
al backlash against terrorism makes ETA’s
future appear dismal. In short, ETA appears to
be dying. While ETA has been pursuing its sep-
aratist agenda for over forty-five years, a large
majority of the Basque people are finally taking
a stand against the group and its practices.
ETA’s reign of terror and power is coming to a
close.
However, the separatist movement is mov-
ing forward — though with a different
approach. Where violence and terrorism failed
to accomplish ETA’s objectives, great strides are
being made in the political arena. Under the
direction of Basque President Juan José
Ibarretxe, the Basque Country government has
passed several resolutions to provide for
1In Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d), the U.S.
government has defined terrorism as “premeditated, polit-
ically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombat-
ant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usu-
ally to influence an audience.” (“Terrorism…”)
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increased Basque autonomy. Drawing on pop-
ular support, these efforts have produced some
limited dialogue with the Spanish government.
While the success of the political initiatives
remains to be seen, there is increased hope for
those Basques who wish to see a more inde-
pendent state.
This article first presents information
about the background of the Basque people and
the origins of ETA. It then analyzes the various
reasons for the weakening of ETA. Lastly, it
explores the potential ramifications of ETA’s
political aspirations and the future of the
Basque cause.
Different Communities
The Kingdom of Spain is a conglomera-
tion of several states molded together through
time and conquest and, today, is politically
divided into nineteen “autonomous communi-
ties,” districts which assume varying degrees of
responsibility ranging from tax collection to
education. As a result of this history, there exist
several peoples within the political borders of
this state, each with their own unique heritage,
culture, language, and history. Among the
many cultural minorities in Spain, three clear-
ly predominate. The first two, the Catalans and
the Galicians, reside along Spain’s east coast
and northwestern corner, respectively. The
Basques make up the third predominant cul-
tural entity and are, perhaps, the most cultur-
ally distinct of the three.
Basque Distinctions
Several types of evidence suggest that the
Basques have lived relatively isolated in the
northeastern corner of Spain for centuries.
These people are culturally different from their
Spanish neighbors on several levels: physical-
ly, linguistically, and historically. Physically, the
Basque people are generally taller than the aver-
age Spaniard, with a more muscular appearance
and distinctive facial characteristics. (Hooper,
p. 387) As their antigen pattern (predominant-
ly type A) and Rhesus count (Rh–) indicate that
they are of a strong European and Westerly ori-
gin, serology also presents a good argument for
the Basque people to have lived in their present
location throughout their history. (Hooper, 
pp. 386–87)
The Basque people are distinguished fur-
ther by their language, Euskara. The language
helps to give them a cultural identity and define
them as a people, and is therefore of great
importance and a significant source of their
national pride. Today, several hundred thousand
people speak the language in the Basque region,
which extends from northeastern Spain into
southwestern France.
Combining these distinctions with archae-
ological evidence leads Hooper, an expert in
Spanish affairs, to suggest that the Basques
... might be direct descendants of
Cro-Magnon man.... [T]he absence
from Basque folklore of any sort of
migration legend, when combined
with the linguistic and serological
evidence, would seem to suggest that
the Basques have lived where they
are now to be found since the Stone
Age. (Hooper, pp. 387–88)
The Basques are further distinguished by
their historical isolation and consider them-
selves to be unique and separate from the rest
of Spain. A strong Basque desire for freedom
and sovereignty, combined with their geo-
graphic isolation, has caused resistance to out-
side influence to become a hallmark of Basque
history. (Hooper, p. 388) When the Moors ruled
Spain for nearly 800 years (AD 718–1492), the
Basques were one of the few unconquered peo-
ples and thus were kept isolated from Muslim
influence that had so great an impact on the
culture of the surrounding regions. When
Franco hoped to minimize the differences
among the Spanish people and establish a
stronger state by suppressing the country’s var-
ious languages, cultures, and groups in the
twentieth century, the Basques were one of the
staunchest resisters to his efforts. Euskara was
banned, intellectuals were imprisoned and tor-
tured, and the Basque fueros2 were revoked
under Franco’s “unification” effort. (“Who...”)
2Fueros are historic provisions granted by the Spanish
federal government that had allowed the Basques to enjoy
a greater degree of autonomy than many of the other
Spanish regions. Responsibilities such as tax collection and
military conscription were allowed to be handled by the
Basque government rather than controlled by the Spanish
government.
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This persecution of their freedoms, culture, and
language only infuriated the Basque people. As
a result, rather than bringing the unity he
desired, Franco’s cultural and political perse-
cution resulted in the polar opposite — a cul-
tural backlash and an explosion of ethnic pride.
It is worth noting that while Franco’s
actions may have led to the growth of Basque
identity, the formation of Basque nationalism
can be attributed almost entirely to Sabino de
Arana Goiri (1865–1903). (Flynn, p. 105) In the
latter part of the 1800s, Arana devoted himself
to promoting Basque nationalism; not only was
he responsible for organizing the Basque cause,
but he also designed the national flag, wrote the
national anthem, and revived Euskara and
shaped it into the language it is today. With
such an impact, it should come as no surprise
that Arana’s views formed the ideological basis
for Basque nationalism. (Flynn, p. 105) Arana’s
views soon increased in popularity. By the end
of the Spanish Civil War and the start of
Franco’s regime, the Basques had grown to see
themselves as increasingly Basque and decreas-
ingly Spanish. Franco’s actions only hastened
this identification, and within decades surveys
of the Basque people reported that 60 percent
of the population considered themselves as only
Basque, while 24 percent felt a dual Basque-
Spanish identity, and only 13 percent saw them-
selves primarily as Spanish. (Conversi, p. 160)
The Birth of ETA
True to the Basque hallmark of resistance
and in conjunction with the growth of nation-
alism, a movement sprang up against Franco
and the injustices against the Basque people. In
1959 a group of young activist students from
the Spanish provinces of Vizcaya and
Guipuzkoa became displeased with the appar-
ent inaction of the leading political party (the
moderate Basque National Party [PNV]).
Organizing themselves to stand against
Franco’s dictatorship, this group formed the
political party/nationalist group EKIN. EKIN
soon took a more radical approach and within
a few years evolved into ETA. (“Basque
Homeland...”)
Decades later, ETA still remains true to its
dual purpose: to claim “an independent home-
land for the Basque people in the Basque
region,” and to gain “self-determination in the
form of a socialist Basque state.” (“Terrorist
Group...”) It is important to note that the
Autonomous Community of the Basque
Country, or Euskadi, in Spain is not considered
by Basques, including ETA, to be the sole extent
of the “Basque region.” Euskadi, rather, is only
part of the Euskadi Herria, “the Basque
Homeland.” (“Euskal...”) According to the offi-
cial Basque Country website, the Euskadi
Herria, shown in Figure 1, is the true extent of
Figure 1
Map of Euskadi Herria
Source: Richburg.
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Basque territory and consists of seven herri-
aldes, or districts, located at the western end of
the Pyrenees on the Bay of Biscay (“Euskal...”).
The three provinces of the Basque Country
(Vizcaya, Alava, and Guipuzkoa) and the
Autonomous Community of Navarre are both
regions within the Kingdom of Spain, while the
three departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra,
and Soule reside in southwestern France.
(“Euskal...”)
Dictatorship to Democracy
The members of ETA have used force to
try to accomplish their nationalist and social-
ist goals of independence and self-autonomy —
force, that is, in the form of terrorism. Since its
first strike in 1959 with a series of bombings
and its first “premeditated political murder”
(Conversi, p. 99) in 1968 of a secret police chief
to the present day, ETA has continued its cam-
paign of violence and terror. ETA has relied
much on the use of bombings and political
assassinations of leaders in the government,
military, and judiciary to advance its agenda.
(“Basque Homeland...”) Perhaps the most sig-
nificant of these acts was the assassination of
Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s likely
successor, in December 1973. This assassina-
tion, a retaliatory strike for the execution of
Basque militants (“ETA: Key...”), aided Spain’s
transition to democracy. (Kasmir, p. 96) The
International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism (ICT) believes that his death “may
have significantly hastened the end of Spanish
fascism.” (“Basque Homeland...”)
While ETA originally organized to combat
the abuses under Franco’s dictatorship, the
group did not disband with the Spanish transi-
tion to democracy after his death in 1975. On
the contrary, ETA’s work assumed a new fervor;
1980 was ETA’s deadliest year and resulted in
118 deaths. As Michel Wieviorka, a professor of
sociology in France, notes, “As Spanish society
made the transition to democracy, [ETA]
became more violent and more separatist rather
than less. Terrorism escalated just as democra-
cy had indisputably established itself.”
(Wieviorka, p. 292) Since its formation, ETA has
been responsible for the deaths of more than
850 people and approximately 1,600 terrorist
attacks. (“U.S....”)
This rise in violence was not due to any
failure by the Spanish government to include
or represent Basque interests in the formation
of the new government. In fact, the Basque
Country gained a greater level of liberty with
the transition to democracy, and the BBC
reports that the Basques have a higher level of
autonomy than any other Spanish region.
(“Who...”) Passed on December 18, 1978, the
Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country
granted broad powers to the Basque Country
and served as the basis for Basque rights. These
powers and rights include maintaining its own
parliament and police force, running an edu-
cation program (in which Euskara is promot-
ed) (“Basque Homeland...”), and handling their
own tax collection. (“Who...”) Nevertheless, ETA
steadfastly continues to fight for full indepen-
dence, regardless of risk or cost.
Weakening and Decline
Despite its determination, it has become
apparent that ETA has been weakening. The
structure of the organization has been taxed by
ideological divisions and the loss of its leader-
ship. Strong public support has been trans-
formed to strong public opposition. The gov-
ernments of Spain and many other countries
have taken strong stances against the group,
and its numbers have been dwindling. As a
result of these contributing causes, the group
has lost much of the strength and support it
once wielded.3
Disorganization, Reduction, and
Public Alienation
Two of the leading causes of ETA’s weak-
ness spring from its internal conflicts and
resulting disorganization. ETA was originally
organized into five different “fronts” on which
the ideals of the movement were to be carried
out: the promotion of Euskara, education,
political propaganda, legal action, and military
action. However, a succession of internal con-
3Several of the points made in this section rely upon the
work that Washington Post foreign correspondent Keith B.
Richburg presented in his December 2003 article.
(Richburg)
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flicts over political and ideological disputes
resulted in a series of divisions. Hooper states
that after each of these divisions “the more vio-
lent, less intellectual group... survived intact.”
(Hooper, p. 399) The remaining membership
no longer has the capacity to engage efficient-
ly on five fronts; today, membership primarily
consists of what used to be the military wing of
the organization.
What was once strong public support of
ETA has transformed over time to strong pub-
lic opposition. In the early years of the group’s
formation, the public viewed ETA members as
martyrs for their cause and demonstrated their
support publicly. For instance, the 1968 killing
of an ETA member by police brought about
mass demonstrations in every city throughout
the Basque Country, and priests held masses in
the martyr’s memory for weeks afterward. Such
popular uprisings encouraged large numbers of
supporters to join in ETA’s work. (Conversi, 
p. 99)
Years later, the situation has changed
greatly. Daniele Conversi, a senior lecturer at
the University of Lincoln (U.K.) and an expert
in nationalism, refers to a survey in 1982 of the
Basque population. Fewer than fifteen years
after the demonstrations mentioned above, 77
percent of the population were opposed to ETA’s
activities and only 8 percent claimed to support
the group. Subsequent surveys since 1982 show
a continual decrease in ETA popularity, result-
ing largely from ETA’s “indiscriminate killings
and purely terrorist acts which departed sharply
from its original tactics.” (Conversi, p. 159)
One of the critical turning points in pub-
lic opinion occurred in 1987. In the deadliest
single attack the group has committed to the
present time, a car bomb was set off in a park-
ing garage beneath a Barcelona supermarket.
Although ETA had phoned to warn of the blast,
the civilians were unable to be evacuated in
time; 21 people were killed. While the BBC
quotes the group as apologizing for their “mis-
take” (“ETA: Key...”), ETA was not dissuaded
from its quest. Instead, ETA has continued its
attacks against military and political targets,
including two high profile attempted assassi-
nations in 1995 against both King Juan Carlos
and Jose Maria Aznar, the former Prime
Minister. (“ETA Violence...”)
A second critical turning point occurred a
decade later. In July 1997 ETA kidnapped 29-
year-old Miguel Angel Blanco, a councilor for
the Popular Party (PP) in the Basque region,
and demanded the release of 460 ETA prisoners
as ransom. After the Spanish government
refused to comply, Blanco was shot twice in the
head and killed. (“Who...”) Public indignation
over this murder far exceeded any previous
grievance against ETA. People previously hesi-
tant to speak out against ETA violence and
oppression no longer feared for their lives as
more than six million people across Spain
demonstrated over a four-day period and
demanded an end to ETA’s violence. For the first
time, even several ETA supporters publicly con-
demned the murder. (“Who...”) This public
mobilization allowed more open expression of
displeasure with ETA; no longer did the people
need to fear ETA in the way they once had.
As alluded to earlier, perhaps the most
critical reason for the weakening of ETA’s pub-
lic support is its extremist viewpoints. While
many Basques support independence,4 other
Basques are content with the extensive auton-
omy they currently have and accept that they
are Spanish as well as Basque. (“The Basque
ETA”) While the people may be divided about
this issue, there is a strong majority of people
in the Basque Country who are opposed to ETA’s
use of violence (“ETA Violence...”), as clearly
demonstrated in the protest over Blanco’s mur-
der. The BBC further reports that ETA and its
extremist followers are losing support because
many believe that ETA is  “desperately out of
touch with public opinion.” (“Who...”) This
extremism has alienated many of the Basque
people, including members of the intelligentsia.
Richburg quotes Andolin Eguzkitza, a profes-
sor of Basque culture in Bilbao: “You can’t kill
people just because they disagree with you
...[and] [p]eople of goodwill are getting fed
up....Today, many people who have been defend-
ing the work of ETA would say they have to
stop.” (Richburg )
It is important to note that some public
support for ETA does remain. In August 2000
thousands of people showed their support after
4Opinion polls suggest that diehard secessionists make
up almost a quarter of the population. (“A House…”)
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four ETA members were killed transporting
explosives. (“ETA: Key...”) However, at the time
of this writing, the organization’s strength
appears to be fairly low. As Table 1 indicates, the
number of attacks and murders committed by
the group have also decreased dramatically.
Annual results from 2003 show a reduction of
over 60 percent in the number of attacks and
over 85 percent in the number of deaths since
2000. The National Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism
Knowledge Base estimates group strength to be
only about 300 members. (“Terrorist Group...”)
The ICT concurs, believing that ETA member-
ship is “quite small, perhaps no more than 20
hard-core activists and several hundred sup-
porters.” (“Basque Homeland...”)
Strong Spanish Political Stance
under Aznar
The Spanish government has also taken a
strong stance against the group and its vio-
lence, and its efforts have successfully ham-
pered the group’s logistic, recruitment, and
operational capabilities. (“Patterns...,” p. 54) In
its 2004 “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” the U.S.
State Department affirms that Spain has made
“extensive progress” as it fights to eliminate
ETA, carrying out many seizures of supplies and
weapons and making numerous arrests.
(“Patterns...,” p. 54) Richburg argues that
although Spain has given the Basques a great
degree of freedom, it refuses to grant indepen-
dence. (Richburg) As long as ETA demands
complete autonomy, it will be at odds with the
Spanish government.
Former Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar’s
hard-line policy toward ETA — “No negotia-
tions, no concessions and unrelenting police
pressure” (Richburg) — has brought much suc-
cess and has kept the group on the defensive.
(Richburg) In a September 2004 speech at
Georgetown University, Aznar acknowledged
that “ETA itself is prostrated, but not finished.”
(Aznar) A strong, determined fight against ETA
requires clear identification of what ETA truly
is, as he expounded upon in his speech.
Terrorism must be condemned in all
circumstances. There are no good
forms of terrorism. Many times I
have read and heard in the U.S.
media about ETA terrorists being
described as “young rebels” and “pro-
independence militants.” These indi-
viduals murder, kidnap, torture and
bully free citizens in a democratic
country. They are terrorists, and
nothing more. To look with sympa-
thy upon those who commit crimes
thousands of miles away is immoral
and detrimental.... Calling ETA 
a “separatist group”... would be 
like calling al-Qaeda “a spiritual
organization.” Simply unacceptable.
(Aznar)
However, regardless of their effectiveness
in weakening the group, Aznar’s views and poli-
cies have not been without skeptics. Many in
the Basque region believe his policies lacked a
crucial component by failing to open political
dialogue with moderate Basque nationalists,
potential allies who run the government and
who also reject violence. (Richburg) Yet, despite
the strong criticism, Aznar has garnered inter-
national support for his stance against ETA, and
his arrests, seizures, and efforts have greatly
weakened it.
International Cooperation
Despite its modest roots, ETA has grown
into an international organization, reported 
Table 1
ETA Attacks
Year Deaths Attacks/Bombings
2000 23 44
2001 15 43
2002 5 20
2003 3 17
Source: Richburg.
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to have members and underground supporters
spread around the globe. (“Basque
Homeland...”) Of all its locations, the most cru-
cial for ETA activity has been France. Not only
is part of southern France part of Euskadi
Herria, but also, being outside Spanish juris-
diction, it has served as a rear base and safe
haven for ETA. (Fraysse) However, with the
international response to the events of
September 11th  and the increased govern-
mental cooperation occurring within Europe,
ETA has been forced to adapt its techniques and
methods.
In 1997, the United States added ETA to
its terrorism list (Richburg), and in 2001 the
Spanish government achieved a significant
diplomatic victory when, for the first time, all
fifteen member governments of the EU desig-
nated ETA as a terrorist organization. (“ETA:
Key...”) This designation was critical to the suc-
cess of the efforts against ETA, and many
nations have aided in capturing and bringing
ETA members to justice. Over the past several
years, many arrests have been made, resulting
in the imprisonment of nearly 700 ETA mem-
bers in Spain and France. In 2003 alone,
Spanish and French authorities arrested 171
ETA members and accomplices. Germany, the
Netherlands, and several countries in Latin
America have also helped to detain ETA mem-
bers. (“Patterns...,” p. 118) France’s commit-
ment to fight ETA, prompted by the EU’s des-
ignation of it as a terrorist organization, has
been a leading cause of this success. Whereas
the French police had been previously slow in
their efforts, French anti-terrorism police have
put “severe pressure” (Richburg) on ETA mem-
bers. (Richburg)
As mentioned previously, the loss of top
leadership due to these arrests and actions has
also been critical to ETA’s weakening. While
new leaders often quickly step in to replace the
lost leaders, ETA has been devastated by its fluc-
tuation in leadership and organization. (Woolls)
Moreover, these new leaders, too, have been
arrested as the international community fights
against ETA.
The international effort has not solely
been limited to arrests and seizures of weapons.
Financial assets have been frozen by the U.S.
and other nations in an attempt to cut the fund-
ing of ETA’s operations. In May 2002 the U.S.
Department of the Treasury froze the accounts
of seven individuals accused of supporting ETA
and also took action against the organization
Askatasuna, which Paul O’Neill, the U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury, claimed was “an ETA
front whose actions are controlled by ETA to
complement and support ETA militants.”
(“U.S....”)
IRA “Conversion” to Peace
The result of the signing of the Northern
Ireland Peace Agreement in April 1998 also
dealt a strong blow to the ETA cause. ETA has
been known to have dealings with the Irish
Republican Army (IRA); and its political wing,
Batasuna, has been schooled on negotiation
strategy by Sinn Fein, the political wing of the
IRA. (“ETA: Key...”) However, some believe that
the connection runs much deeper. In a report
presented to the U.S. Congress, experts believe
that ETA “has often followed the IRA’s lead in
terms of tactics and operations.” (Cronin, p. 21),
while Richburg adds that the IRA can be viewed
as ETA’s ideological big brother. (Richburg)
With the IRA observing a cease fire, reducing
its arsenal, apologizing for killing civilians, and
progressing through a peace process, ETA has
become more concerned as to what its own
future holds.
Following the IRA peace agreement, ETA
announced a cease fire in September 1998, the
first time the group has done so since its for-
mation. While the fourteen-month respite was
to allow for talks to begin between Batasuna and
the Spanish government, ETA instead utilized
the truce as a means to obtain more supplies
and munitions. (“Basque Homeland...”)
According to the ICT, when the cease fire ended
ETA blamed “the repressive measures taken by
the Spanish government” and the “failure of
mainstream Basque nationalists to work with
it toward the creation of an independent Basque
state.” (“Basque Homeland...”) In an official
statement, ETA claimed, “The [peace] process
is blocked and poisoned. Responding to a pledge
to defend the Basque Country, the decision has
been taken to reactivate the use of armed strug-
gle.” (“Basque Homeland...”)
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Politics
The international cooperation evident in
ETA arrests and financial disruptions has also
existed in Spanish dealings with Batasuna and
has contributed to the further weakening of the
group. Batasuna is to ETA what Sinn Fein has
been for the Irish Republican Army. Formed in
1979, this nationalist-left party has had support
fluctuating between five and ten percent from
a Basque population of little more than two mil-
lion. (Aulestia)
Batasuna denies ties to ETA (Tremlett),
but the Spanish Interior Ministry argues to the
contrary. The government maintains that
Batasuna has “never condemned an attack, nor
have they ever asked ETA to abandon its
weapons.” (“ETA: Murder...”) According to the
Interior Ministry, Batasuna has attended inter-
national forums and presented ETA as a sepa-
ratist organization, discredited Spanish democ-
racy, and complained of supposed oppression
experienced under the Spanish state. (“ETA:
Murder...”) 
Acting on the connection between ETA
and Batasuna, Aznar decided to take a stance
against the political arm of ETA. Following a
court case in August 2002, Judge Baltasar
Garzon suspended the party for three years due
to its connections with ETA, which he declared
“guilty of crimes against humanity.” (“ETA:
Key...”) Nine months later, Batasuna was per-
manently banned by the Spanish Supreme
Court as a result of the party’s failure to con-
demn the acts carried out by ETA. This ban not
only prohibits Batasuna members from serving
on local and regional government positions, but
also freezes the group’s funding. (“Patterns...,”
p. 54) Again, other nations have supported the
Spanish government, with the United States
(May 2003) and the EU (June 2003) designat-
ing Batasuna a terrorist organization. This ban
has caused a gradual yet progressive decrease
in electoral votes (“ETA: Murder...”), thereby
decreasing ETA’s political power.
Political Options
ETA’s weakening has provided opportuni-
ties for a new political deal between the Spanish
government and the Basque people. (Richburg)
As Basque politicians — with the exception of
Batasuna members — generally support ETA’s
goals but not its methods (“Q&A...”), many peo-
ple now believe that politics, rather than vio-
lence, is the means to achieving Basque inde-
pendence.
One of the men leading this charge is Juan
José Ibarretxe, the Lehendakari, or president,
of the Basque Country. Elected by the Basque
Parliament in July 2001, Ibarretxe has been an
outspoken advocate of increasing Basque sov-
ereignty. In a recent speech, Ibarretxe stated, “I
want you to know that the Basque Country will
never take part in a project of joint co-existence
with the State, if it is not done of its own free
will, because the Basque Country is not a sub-
ordinate part of Spain.” (Ibarretxe) However,
Ibarretxe has also been unwavering in his con-
demnation of ETA and its tactics. As quoted by
Richburg, Ibarretxe condemns the violence
“totally and absolutely.... We have never defend-
ed our ideas with guns and we will never defend
our ideas with guns.” (Richburg) He also argues
that the true desire of the Basque people is to
determine their own future and to be rid of
ETA’s barbarity. (Font) Politics, instead, will
replace violence in what Ibarretxe calls the
beginning of the “post-ETA era.” (Ibarretxe, as
quoted in “Ibarretxe Maintains...”)
Ibarretxe seeks to establish recognition
and an international presence for the Basque
people: politically, culturally, socially, and polit-
ically. At an international Basque gathering in
October 1999, Ibarretxe stated in the opening
speech:
[O]ur aim should be to move from
the knowledge of a Basque reality in
the world to gradual international
recognition as a people. Recognition
not only of our history and past char-
acteristics. This is important, but it
is insufficient. A recognition of what
we are today: a country with its own
identity. (“World...,” p. 23)
Despite these statements, Ibarretxe has
maintained that he does not desire political
independence for the Basque Country, but
would only like to have freedom to be able to
represent Basque interests in world affairs. This
has led to the creation of the “Ibarretxe plan.”
The plan, “Proposal for the Political Statute of
the Community of the Basque Country,” was
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passed October 25, 2003, by the Basque gov-
ernment on what Ibarretxe claimed as “a his-
toric day for our people.” (“Institutional...”) As
Ibarretxe continues in his speech:
This new Political Statute of the
Basque Country represents...[a] com-
mitment to provide a solution, a pos-
itive commitment, a commitment to
an affirmative response, to a “yes”
response. Yes to human rights and
the freedom of all individuals. Yes to
respecting the democratic rights of
Basque society to decide their own
future without violence. Yes to the
social construction of a Basque
Country for all Basque citizens, with-
out exclusion....We are fully con-
vinced that a higher degree of self-
government will also bring with it a
higher level of well-being for each
and every one of us...[and] a better
life.... The new Statute does not pro-
pose a split but a new framework of
coexistence with the Spanish State....
We ask only for the right to express
ourselves. (“Institutional...”)
The plan calls, in short, for the Basque Country
to have status as a freely-associated state, com-
plete with its own foreign policy, separate
courts, and even its own representation in the
European Union.
However, the plan has met great resis-
tance, especially from the Spanish government.
As quoted by Richburg, Ibarretxe maintains that
his plan “is not an independence plan...[nor] a
plan to break up Spain, but a plan to coexist
with Spain.” (Richburg) But Gustavo de
Aristegui, a member of Spanish parliament and
the majority leader on foreign policy, claims
that the plan is “a back door to sovereignty.”
(Richburg) Aznar responded to Ibarretxe’s plan
by introducing legislation that would change
the criminal code; with the change, a politician
who calls for a referendum outside of his juris-
diction could be jailed — a change that would
apply directly to Ibarretxe and his sovereignty
plan. (Font)
With Zapatero’s election as Prime Minister
of Spain, Ibarretxe has stated that he looks for-
ward to working with the new leader. While he
noted a “lack of communication” under Aznar’s
Popular Party, Ibarretxe believes “the era of dia-
logue had been ushered in with Zapatero in
power.” (“Ibarretxe Maintains...”) Ibarretxe also
feels that it is essential to have communication
between the Lehendakari and the Prime
Minister, despite their differing viewpoints.
(“Ibarretxe Maintains....”)
Despite new opportunities arising to dis-
cuss these issues, consensus among the Basque
people remains a more fundamental problem,
one that will need to be worked out in the near
future. Iñaki Galdós, the President of Eusko
Alkartasuna (one of the leading political parties
in the Basque Country), states, “The problem is
that Basques do not agree on how to resolve the
situation they live in.... [We have to find] a com-
mon diagnosis about the Basque conflict and
about our identity, because so many different
interpretations block the way forward.” (Galdós,
as quoted by Font)
Moving Forward
The goal of the most recent international
Basque meeting was Aurrera Goaz, Basque for
“We go forward.” (Totoricagüena) With ETA vio-
lence in decline and a growing chance for a
political solution, the opportunity to move
toward a resolution to the question of Basque
autonomy in northeastern Spain may be greater
than it has ever been. The installation of a new
Spanish government and communication
between the Basque Country and Madrid pro-
vide hope that an end may be in sight. Provided
that the government continues its strong poli-
cy towards ETA and its violence, there remains
the potential for an end to the violence. Gorka
Landaburu, a magazine editor and radio com-
mentator, states: “Little by little, it’s the end of
ETA.... ETA is arriving at the end of the road....
It’s the end of ETA, thanks to the pressure,
thanks to the international cooperation.”
(Landaburu, as quoted by Richburg)
In its efforts to bring about the end of ETA,
the Spanish government must be careful not to
alienate those Basque citizens who are willing
and anxious to talk about their future. The lead-
ers must take into account the Basque desire
for independence. The Basque people must also
realize that complete independence or autono-
my may not be a feasible option, although sen-
timents for independence still remain strong.
In time, a solution will be reached. The open-
ing of communication between the two parties
is only the first step.
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